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Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) offices
in five U.S. cities have received warnings of an
imminent bioterrorist attack. Each threat
indicated that a shower of anthrax would rain
on U.S. cities, unless certain demands were met
immediately. One of these calls was in
Northeast, a large city on the Eastern Seaboard
with a metropolitan population of 2 million. The
threats were credible, but no information was
relayed to city officials in Northeast or elsewhere.
On the evening of November 1, a professional
football game is being played in Northeasts
outdoor stadium before an audience of 74,000.
The evening sky is overcast, the temperature
mild, a breeze blows from west to east. During
the first quarter of the game, an unmarked truck
drives along an elevated highway a mile upwind
of the stadium. As it passes the stadium, the
truck releases an aerosol of powdered anthrax
over 30 seconds, creating an invisible, odorless
anthrax cloud more than a third of a mile in
breadth. The wind blows the cloud across the
stadium parking lots, into and around the
stadium, and onward for miles over the
neighboring business and residential districts.
After the anthrax release, the truck continues
driving and is more than 100 miles away from the
city by the time the game is finished. The
anthrax release is detected by no one.
Approximately 16,000 of the 74,000 fans are
infected by the anthrax cloud; another 4,000 in
the business and residential districts downwind
of the stadium also are infected. After the game,
the fans disperse to their homes in the greater
Northeast metropolitan area; some return to
homes in neighboring states. A few are from
other countries. The driver of the truck and his
associates leave the country by plane that night.
They will be many time zones away by the time
the first symptoms of anthrax appear 2 days
later.
Two days after the game, hundreds of people
in and around Northeast become ill with fever,
cough, and (in some cases) shortness of breath
and chest pain. Some of the sick self-administer
over-the-counter cold remedies; some seek phone
advice from physicians and nurses; others are
seen in clinics, doctors offices, and emergency
departments throughout the city.
Influenza cases had been seen in Northeast 2
weeks before the game. Health-care providers
seeing the new patients recommend bed rest and
fluids for presumed flu. Specimens are sent to
confirm influenza. A few of the sickest patients
get chest radiographs to exclude pneumonia.
Only in retrospect, after the source of illness is
clear, will the widened mediastinum seen on a
number of chest radiographs be recognized for
the signal it carries. A few patients are
hospitalized; some have blood cultures drawn.
The 400 ill persons in the region are receiving
care from so many different sources that the
health emergency is not detected.
By November 4, nurses and physicians note
the increased volume of serious upper respira-
tory illness, and some contact the city health
department for treatment recommendations and
a regional flu update. Blood cultures from the
earliest patients grow gram-positive bacilli in
seven laboratories around the city. The laborato-
ries identify these as Bacillus species. No further
identification is requested, and none is pursued.
By the evening of November 4, patients with
the earliest symptoms are dying. The illness has
been rapidly fatal, killing previously healthy
young adults within 24 to 48 hours. Members of
the medical community, now alarmed by these
unexpected and unexplained deaths, urgently
contact the state and city health departments.
Health department officials contact the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). By
midnight November 4, 1,200 people around the
city have fallen ill, 80 of whom have died.
Word that previously healthy persons are
dying of a rapidly fatal illness spreads quickly
among health-care providers in the state, and is
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featured on local and national morning news
shows. News media interview families of the
deceased, physicians, and city health officials.
Expert consultants appear on television to
discuss potential diagnoses, including the new
Spanish flu, Hong Kong bird flu, and many other
infectious and noninfectious diseases. A rapid
survey of city emergency departments and
health clinics finds that persons of all ages and
from all sectors of the city continue to come down
with similar illness. The numbers have doubled
since the previous day, inundating many health-
care facilities.
The mayor convenes an emergency meeting
of leading medical experts and health officials as
reporters gather outside city hall. The assembled
experts debate possible causes and responses to
the illness. Many express great concern that a
virulent strain of influenza or another highly
contagious disease may be present. Isolation of
all persons with fever, cough, or chest pain;
expanded laboratory analyses; and rapid
epidemiologic investigation are recommended.
Blood and tissue specimens are sent to CDC for
urgent analysis. CDC investigators are en route.
During a news conference, the mayor describes
the citys response to what appears to be a serious
influenza outbreak, appeals for public calm, and
is surprised by questions about the possibility of
bioterrorism.
By noon November 5, intensive-care units
and isolation beds across the city are full. Even
patients receiving the most advanced medical
care are dying. Patients are febrile, hypotensive,
and seem to be in septic shock; some have
meningitis. Still, there is no diagnosis. At some
locations, the shock of rapid and unexplained
deaths has created an atmosphere of desperation
and confusion among hospital and clinic staff.
The recommended isolation protocols quickly
fall apart as hospital and clinic staffs struggle to
cope with the surge of patients. Fears of a
contagious disease prompt hospital staff to don
protective positive-pressure hoods; the news
shows physicians working in this gear and
explains that there are only two dozen or so such
hoods available per hospital.
In the early evening of November 5, a
university laboratory makes a preliminary
diagnosis of anthrax from the blood culture of a
young patient who died. The laboratory
immediately notifies city and state health
departments, which in turn notify CDC and FBI.
The specimen is transferred to the U.S. Army
Medical Research Institute of Infectious Dis-
eases (USAMRIID), where within hours experts
report that rapid diagnostic tests support the
preliminary diagnosis of anthrax.
The mayor of Northeast consults with
officials from the city and state health
departments, CDC, FBI, and USAMRIID. The
working assumptions are that the disease in
Northeast is anthrax and that it is the result of a
bioterrorist attack. Widespread exposure to an
anthrax aerosol is feared.
The mayor is outraged to learn that the FBI
had not informed her of the credible anthrax
threat to Northeast. She is also shocked that it
has taken more than 80 deaths and hundreds of
illnesses before anyone from the medical
community came up with the diagnosis. She is
informed that an anthrax vaccine exists, but it is
unclear whether any will be made available for
civilian use in Northeast. No one can yet
estimate the probable scale of the epidemic or
whether there has been a single or multiple
attacks. CDC is seeking news of similar
syndromes in other locations around the
country. The mayors medical advisors recom-
mend that quinolone antibiotics be used for
initial treatment of the sick. They also advise the
same antibiotics for those exposed to anthrax but
not yet sick, even though identifying the exposed
will take time and requires more information. All
that is known is that many (but not all) of the dying
had been at the football game on November 1.
The mayor also is told that to prevent death,
antibiotics must be given before symptoms occur,
or at the latest, in the earliest hours after
symptoms begin. Patients with serious symp-
toms are likely to die, no matter what anyone
does. Available information suggests that the
local supply of needed antibiotics will soon be
exhausted; many local pharmacies were already
emptied of antibiotics as the initial news of a
lethal epidemic spread through the city. Given
this shortage of antibiotics, one senior advisor
asks the mayor to consider a triage plan that uses
all available antibiotics to protect the exposed
who are not yet sick. In this plan, antibiotics
would be kept from those already sick and thus
likely to die, regardless of treatment. The mayor
requests immediate federal assistance in
obtaining and distributing large supplies of
antibiotics. Antibiotic shipments from other
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State officials notify hospitals around the
city of the anthrax epidemic and warn them to
prepare for a new surge of patients in the wake of
the mayors forthcoming TV address. Recom-
mendations for the care of infected patients are
sent to hospitals and clinics around the region.
The late night news is interrupted by the
mayor announcing that anthrax had been
released in the city. She outlines the recom-
mended medical response and describes assis-
tance Northeast is seeking from state and federal
agencies. She urges that the needed antibiotics
be taken by all those attending the football game.
For those who attended the game and remain
well, arrangements are being made to distribute
antibiotics at 20 police stations and schools
around the city starting immediately. Antibiotics
will be distributed in packages sufficient for a 1-
week supply. A second phase of distribution will
commence with the arrival of new supplies of
antibiotics. Eventually all those exposed will
need to receive enough antibiotics to take for 60
days.
Persons feeling ill are instructed to report
immediately to hospitals for treatment. The
mayor reports that an official request for vaccine
has been made to the federal government. She
underscores that anthrax is not contagious. She
again appeals for calm.
Tens of thousands rush to police stations and
distribution centers before the antibiotics arrive.
Communication between the distribution cen-
ters, the mayors office, and the antibiotic
suppliers is haphazard. No city plan exists or had
even been considered for mass distribution of
antibiotics. Some centers receive almost no
antibiotics. At other centers, antibiotic supplies
are rapidly exhausted.
At this point, there are effectively no
antibiotics left in the city. Approximately 50,000
persons had obtained some quantity before
supplies ran out, but there is no record of who
has received them. Health-care facilities are
unprepared to cope with the continually rising
number of patients. By the early hours of
November 6, 2,700 persons have become ill with
anthrax, 300 of whom have died. Thousands
more flood doctors offices, clinics, and emer-
gency departments, fearing that they are
infected with anthrax.
On the morning of November 6, the mayor
announces that schools and homeless shelters
will be opened to the ill because hospitals can no
longer accommodate new patients. The National
Guard will keep order. The Office of Emergency
Preparedness, Department of Health and
Human Services, and the Federal Emergency
Management Agency will provide some logistical
support. The city has temporarily run out of
antibiotics, but supplies from neighboring states
are expected. Meanwhile, the media report that
some of the dead were not at the football game
and in fact were miles away from the stadium
that day. Some reporters openly speculate that
antibiotics are being held back by city officials
and that local authorities are losing control of
the epidemic. They also report that false rumors
of arriving antibiotic shipments have sparked
mobs and violence at antibiotic distribution
centers.
At midday November 6, epidemiologists
report that some anthrax patients had not
attended the game, suggesting that exposure
had occurred over a wider area. In addition,
computer models show that wind patterns may
have blown anthrax spores downwind of the
stadium for some miles. The antibiotic recom-
mendations are now being expanded to include
all persons living or working within an area
defined by 8 miles east and 1 mile north or south
of the stadium on November 1. The mayor is told
by her advisors that, in fact, no antibiotic
arrivals are imminent. Some states report they
have no antibiotics to give, some are refusing to
send shipments, and the federal government
reports that it will be at least another 6 hours
before its antibiotic resources arrive. Despite
assurances that anthrax is not contagious,
people with the ability to do so flee Northeast,
causing traffic jams and increasing panic. Some
train conductors, bus drivers, and pilots refuse to
travel to Northeast, citing personal safety
concerns and threatening to walk off the job if
forced. As a result, train, bus, and plane traffic to
and from Northeast is sharply disrupted. By
midnight November 6, anthrax has sickened
3,200 people, 900 of whom have died.
Federal shipments of antibiotics have begun
to arrive by November 7. The distribution
centers, now increased to 40, continue to be
variably stocked with medicine. A heavy
National Guard presence is now evident at
distribution centers to prevent violence. FBI
officials report preliminary evidence that a truck
was the source of the dispersal, though no
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claimed responsibility. They confirm that
threats of an anthrax attack were made in the
week before the event. On televised interviews,
families of the deceased promise legal action
against the FBI for not revealing the threats, and
against local and federal government for not
supplying sufficient antibiotics and vaccine.
Management of dead bodies becomes a growing
crisis. Hospital and city mortuaries are full.
Many funeral homes have closed. The state
health department and CDC report that the
deceased must be cremated. Some citizen and
religious groups threaten that if cremation is
enforced, there may not be full reporting of the
dead, and private burial ceremonies would
continue. By nightfall, 4,000 persons have fallen
ill, 1,600 of whom have died.
By November 8, increasing numbers of the
citys critical work force are absent, including
police, firefighters, bus and subway operators,
building managers, sewage treatment workers,
electricity and water officials, and supermarket
staff. Some are absent because of illness or death
due to anthrax. Some skip work fearing contagious
spread despite official statements to the contrary.
Some simply fear violence in the city. Many of
those with the means to leave the city do so.
National Guardsmen are able to fill some
roles, but many tasks require specialized
expertise. As a result, the public transit system is
barely operational; some of the citys office
buildings are shut down; response time for calls
made to fire, police, and ambulance lengthens.
Schools and universities are closed. State and
city officials become increasingly concerned about
an imperiled city infrastructure. Looting erupts.
The mayor holds a press conference to
address false allegations that anthrax vaccine is
being administered to select individuals in the
city. She reports that federal authorities will
make available some vaccine for those deemed at
highest risk. But due to a national shortage of
vaccine and military concerns that this attack
may herald further attacks, there is only a highly
limited amount of vaccine available. For the most
part, the city will have to manage with
antibiotics alone.
By evening, a total of 4,800 persons have
become ill; 2,400 have died.
Aftermath
Of the 20,000 persons originally infected in
Northeast, 4,000 died, most in the first 10 days
after the attack. Some anthrax cases occurred in
other cities, states, and countries where citizens
attending that football game had returned home.
Occasional cases occur beyond 10 days among
persons refusing or discontinuing the long
course of antibiotics. In all, approximately
250,000 persons receive antibiotics.
The media report that hundreds, if not
thousands, needlessly died because of delays in
antibiotic distribution, and further, that lifesav-
ing antibiotics would have cost $100 per person
a price local and federal authorities had not been
willing to pay. Military intervention in the form
of martial law is avoided, despite calls by some
federal authorities for a modest military
presence to keep peace and stability in a region
clearly under attack. No group can be identified
as the perpetrator, though FBI continues one of
the largest investigations in its history. Many
refuse to return to their homes downwind of the
stadium and demand official compensation.
Businesses downwind of the stadium are shut
down. The stadium is largely abandoned.
Newspapers brand the downwind area the dead
zone. Overall, city commerce suffers tremen-
dous losses. The tourism industry collapses. City
officials estimate it will be months or years before
the city resumes a normal routine. Fear of
anthrax may keep some away from Northeast
indefinitely. On December 1, FBI receives a
threat that anthrax will be released in five major
U.S. cities over the next week.
This scenario is ominous. Such an epidemic
would create extraordinary challenges for a
modern American city. However, there is no
need to give in to the ending of this story.
Practical, modest preparedness efforts could
make a difference and change the outcome.
Many of the most useful efforts may be the result
of ingenuity and depend on collaboration of
experts from many disciplines.
Could the outcome have changed if state and
local health officials had prior notification of the
anthrax threats? Should laboratory practices be
changed to increase the chance of early detection
of anthrax? Should health-care workers become
familiar with the early symptoms and signs of
anthrax? What could hospitals do to prepare for
epidemics of seriously ill patients? Could
communities have plans for rapid mass antibiotic
acquisition and distribution? Should anthrax
vaccine be more widely available? How might
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interact with the media to best inform the public
and avoid misunderstanding and panic? What
should the community, hospitals, and profes-
sional societies be doing? What should you be
doing?
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